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1173 
Essay 
The Rule of Law and the Law of 
Precedents 
Daniel A. Farber† 
“History counts. The only significant question is how.”1 
The relationship between precedent and the rule of law is 
hotly contested.2 On the one hand, consider the views of the 
late Justice Lewis Powell. According to Justice Powell, 
“[E]limination of constitutional stare decisis would represent 
an explicit endorsement of the idea that the Constitution is 
nothing more than what five Justices say it is. This would un-
dermine the rule of law.”3 He added that the “inevitability of 
change touches law as it does every aspect of life. But stability 
and moderation are uniquely important to the law.”4 Powell 
concluded that “restraint in decisionmaking and respect for de-
cisions once made are the keys to preservation of an independ-
ent judiciary and public respect for the judiciary’s role as a 
guardian of rights.”5 
On the other hand, stare decisis has also been portrayed as 
a betrayal of the judge’s duty to follow the law and thus of the 
rule of law itself. Here, consider the view of a current Justice, 
 
†  Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
 1. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 745 (1988). 
 2. For useful overviews, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare De-
cisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 570 (2001); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367 
(1988); Monaghan, supra note 1; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 571 (1987). For insights into how precedent functions in other legal sys-
tems, see D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING 
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997). 
 3. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 281, 288 (1990). 
 4. Id. at 289. 
 5. Id. at 289–90. 
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Antonin Scalia. Rather than embracing precedent as critical to 
the rule of law, he views it as an obstacle to correct constitu-
tional interpretation: 
In any case, I would think it a violation of my oath to adhere to what I 
consider a plainly unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process 
in order that the Court might save face. With some reservation con-
cerning decisions that have become so embedded in our system of 
government that return is no longer possible . . . , I agree with Justice 
Douglas: “A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have com-
pulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But 
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he 
swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors 
may have put on it.” Or as the Court itself has said: “[W]hen con-
vinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow 
precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon 
amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its 
history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its 
constitutional decisions.”6 
In Scalia’s view, when the Court is faced with an erroneous 
prior decision, “[w]e provide far greater reassurance of the rule 
of law by eliminating than by retaining such a decision.”7 
Although most originalists continue to give some weight to 
precedent, the tension between modern judicial doctrine and 
the original understanding may be profound. As Henry Mona-
ghan explains, “[N]o satisfying conception of originalism seems 
capable of accounting for Brown.”8 He adds that “the abortion 
cases, the reapportionment cases, and the sex discrimination 
cases are also inconsistent with any constrained conception of 
the original understanding.”9 Overall, he says: 
[N]o acceptable version of original understanding theory can yield a 
convincing descriptive account of the major features of our ‘Bicenten-
nial Constitution’: nontextual guarantees of civil liberties; a powerful, 
presidentially centered national government; a huge administrative 
apparatus; and national responsibility for what had long been con-
ceived of either as local responsibilities or as not the responsibility of 
government at all.10 
Monaghan sees in this conflict a serious problem that original-
 
 6. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 
736 (1949) and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)), overruled by 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 728 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 9. Id. at 723. Monaghan also argues that the modern presidency is in-
compatible with the original understanding. See id. at 735–39. 
 10. Id. at 739. 
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ists must confront and solve: though “most, if not all” of these 
Supreme Court decisions are “highly suspect” on originalist 
grounds, it seems “almost unquestionable that these decisions 
are now beyond judicial recall.”11 Some originalists may dis-
agree with the particulars or see more room for precedent to fill 
gaps in the original understanding, but the potential impact of 
rejecting precedent in favor of originalism is obviously great.12 
This Essay explores this contested ground. I will begin 
with the familiar pragmatic case for stare decisis, particularly 
as the arguments apply to bedrock precedents. Originalists of-
ten concede the undesirability of overruling bedrock prece-
dents. Yet, they fail to realize the implications of this conces-
sion when combined with the drive of the legal system toward 
consistency and coherence. I will then show how originalism it-
self needs to rely on a system of precedent in order to achieve 
the rule of law. As it turns out, originalists would have need for 
stare decisis even if originalism had been the entrenched 
method of interpretation from the beginning. 
With that background in mind, I will turn to the issue of 
stare decisis and abortion, which has been the focal point of re-
cent disputes over stare decisis. Although the Court has erred 
in viewing its earlier abortion precedents as having heightened 
immunity from overruling, it did give earlier precedent an ap-
propriate place in formulating a standard governing the consti-
tutionality of abortion restrictions. This brings me to the ques-
tion of how to read precedents: as sources of rules or as sources 
of general principles and analogies? The choice is a pragmatic 
one, but contrary to the view of Justice Scalia and others, the 
presumption should be against viewing precedents as rules. 
Stare decisis seeks to preserve stability, but the doctrine 
must also leave room for innovation and correction of error. 
 
 11. Id. at 740. 
 12. Like many who seek radical social change, beginning with Martin Lu-
ther, those who attack basic precedents claim only to be restoring a “true” but 
forgotten social order. For instance, in critiquing a Burkean defense of stare 
decisis, Steven Calabresi says: “The sweeping away of wayward practices and 
the restoration of fundamental constitutional traditions is a form of conserva-
tive revolutionary change, not French revolutionary change.” Steven G. 
Calabresi, Overrule Casey!: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments 
Against Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcom-
ing Apr. 2006) (manuscript at 33, on file with author). Whether revolutionar-
ies are inspired by memories of a glorious past or visions of an entrancing fu-
ture, however, revolutions are likely to be just as dislocating and risky to 
bystanders. 
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Striking the right balance is not easy. In the end, I opt for a 
version of stare decisis in which rulings are not overturned ex-
cept for strong reasons, and only for compelling reasons in the 
case of what I call “bedrock” precedents.13 But this version of 
stare decisis is not rigid, because it sees doctrine as evolving 
over multiple decisions rather than “written in stone” in indi-
vidual decisions. That is to say, my view of precedent disfavors 
overruling, especially of lines of precedent rather than individ-
ual cases,14 but leaves more room than Scalia’s does for good-
faith reinterpretation. 
I.  THE PRAGMATIC CASE FOR STARE DECISIS 
Stare decisis is not rocket science.15 Many of the reasons 
for giving weight to precedents are easily grasped, particularly 
for those bedrock precedents that provide the clearest examples 
of the need for stare decisis. Nevertheless, even if they seem 
somewhat familiar, those reasons are worth reviewing given 
recent criticisms of stare decisis. 
A. BENEFITS OF STARE DECISIS 
Few lawyers deny that precedent plays some legitimate 
role in Supreme Court decisions.16 Nevertheless, it is instruc- 
 
 
 13. The “compelling reasons” exception certainly covers the Court’s rejec-
tion of the prior doctrine of “separate but equal” in Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. If 
nothing else, history had shown the old doctrine to be a chimera: there was 
plenty of “separate” but nothing “equal” in Jim Crow! 
 14. It is only fair to ask whether the category of bedrock doctrines coin-
cides with my substantive preferences. The answer is, at least, not entirely. In 
my view, this approach to stare decisis would probably insulate a number of 
doctrines that I consider incorrectly decided as an original matter, such as the 
application of the Eleventh Amendment to federal question cases, the consti-
tutionalizing of executive privilege, the regulatory takings doctrine, and the 
requirement of “injury in fact” as a basis for standing. 
 15. On the contrary, it takes much more intellectual ability to mount an 
attack on something that is so obviously in accord with common sense. 
 16. For an early counterexample, arguing that stare decisis is contrary to 
progressive thinking, see Boyd Winchester, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 8 
GREEN BAG 257 (1896). An even earlier example is Chief Justice Taney’s opin-
ion in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dis-
senting). Even earlier, Jonathan Swift mocked stare decisis, describing it as 
an effort to preserve “‘all the decisions formerly made against common justice 
and the general reason of mankind.’” See Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the 
Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 67, 67 (1988) (quoting JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 
275 (Novel Library ed. 1947) (1726)). 
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tive to consider the reasons why precedent is so important, how 
precedent is used, and what the use of precedent tells us about 
the nature of constitutional law. 
Although precedents seem to have special force for the ju-
diciary, consideration of past decisions is important in other 
settings. We can divide the reasons for respecting precedent 
into three groups: (a) those that apply to every decision maker, 
judicial or otherwise; (b) those that particularly apply to courts; 
and (c) those that are especially linked with the nature of con-
stitutional law.17 
There are obvious reasons why any decision maker should 
consider the views of her predecessors. These reasons apply as 
much to a low-level officer such as a school principal as to a 
Justice or a President.18 One of these universal justifications is 
efficiency: it saves time and trouble to rely on earlier deci-
sions.19 To reconsider all of our commitments and practices on a 
daily basis would ensure paralysis. 
It is simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs all 
of the time.20 Imagine if, in every First Amendment case, the 
lawyers had to reargue basic questions such as whether the 
First Amendment applies to the states or whether it covers 
nonpolitical speech (both of which have been debated by schol-
ars). Every brief would have to be a treatise, arguing every 
point of First Amendment doctrine from scratch. Moreover, dif-
ferent judges could adopt completely different First Amend-
ment theories, so a lawyer in a case before the Supreme Court 
might have to write nine different briefs based on inconsistent 
theories of the Constitution. Similarly, dialogue between the 
Justices themselves would be stymied because they would be 
operating within different conceptual frameworks. Unless most 
issues can be regarded as settled most of the time, coherent 
discussion is simply impossible. Surely “it would overtax the  
 
 
 17. A good summary of the standard arguments for respecting precedent 
can be found in Maltz, supra note 2, at 368–72. 
 18. This aspect of stare decisis is explored in Schauer, supra note 2, at 
572. As he says, “In countless instances, out of law as well as in, the fact that 
something was done before provides, by itself, a reason for doing it that way 
again.” Id. 
 19. This efficiency justification is explained in Jonathan R. Macey, The 
Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 93, 102 (1989). 
 20. On the agenda-control function of stare decisis, see Fallon, supra note 
2, at 573; Monaghan, supra note 1, at 744–46. 
FARBER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:11:10 AM 
1178 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1173 
 
Court and the country alike to insist . . . that everything always 
must be up for grabs at once.”21 
A second reason is humility. It would be arrogant to as-
sume that we alone have access to wisdom. The views of earlier 
decision makers are entitled to a respectful hearing for that 
reason alone. Some of those judges are entitled to particular re-
spect—John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Louis 
Brandeis come immediately to mind as great figures in the his-
tory of the Supreme Court.22 The argument based on humility 
does not support adherence to precedents that are now known 
to be clearly wrong, but it does support some degree of defer-
ence when we are unsure of the merits of an issue.23 As even 
one of the sharpest critics of stare decisis concedes, some degree 
of respect for prior decisions is warranted even if precedent is 
not considered binding: 
Abrogating stare decisis . . . is not inconsistent with according appro-
priate respect to precedent. “Respect” implies an obligation of due con-
sideration, careful reflection, and deference to the fact that other in-
telligent and reflective judges have thought about an issue before and 
taken care to express their reasoning in writing. . . . According prece-
dent proper respect could entail simply giving the decisions of prior 
courts respectful consideration and deference—perhaps even the 
benefit of the doubt in cases of uncertainty.24 
It is true that this kind of “respect” is less than what strong 
versions of stare decisis might call for, but respect can easily 
shade into a habit of deference, and deference can solidify into 
obedience. 
Another set of reasons applies, to some extent, to the school 
principal, but much more to the judge. One is the moral desir-
 
 21. Fallon, supra note 2, at 584; see also id. at 593 (“And so the process 
would continue, literally without surcease, for no question ever could be 
deemed to have been settled definitively.”). 
 22. Cf. Macey, supra note 19, at 111 (“Well known jurists such as Henry J. 
Friendly, John Harlan, and Richard Posner are distinguished for their love of 
the law as well as for their reasoning ability. Their name on an opinion has a 
signaling effect that magnifies its value.”). 
 23. Moreover, earlier judges operated in a different context, so their deci-
sions provide a check on what might be the influence of biases and wishful 
thinking on our own decisions. Furthermore, older decisions have stood the 
test of time—we generally know that they have not caused big problems, 
whereas a change in rules might have unforeseen consequences. For example, 
the shift from coinage to paper money does not seem to have caused economic 
problems, but it is less clear what a reversal might do. 
 24. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May 
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 
1535, 1545–46 (2000). 
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ability of equal treatment. It seems arbitrary for a case to be 
decided one way this year, perhaps leading to a prisoner’s exe-
cution or other serious consequences, and for an identical case 
to be decided the opposite way next year simply because of a 
change in judicial personnel.25 This call for uniformity is not an 
unshakeable imperative, but it does caution against departing 
from precedent too quickly. Given the critical issues that often 
come before the courts, consistency seems especially important. 
A related reason for adhering to precedent is that only by 
following the reasoning of previous decisions can the courts 
provide guidance for the future, rather than a series of uncon-
nected outcomes in particular cases. If all we know is that a 
court affirmed some convictions and reversed others, we can 
have very little confidence in guessing what rule applies in the 
future.26 By articulating standards that are binding for the fu-
ture, courts can offer some semblance of what has been called 
the “law of rules,”27 which is one aspect of the rule of law.28 
Also relating specifically to the judiciary is the discipline 
imposed on decision making by the knowledge that a decision 
will function as a precedent.29 In deciding a particular case, a 
judge must provide reasons that will have precedential effect 
on later cases (both in the same court and in lower courts). 
Thus, the judge is pushed to a form of neutrality—not the neu-
trality of being value-free, but the neutrality of articulating 
standards that one is willing to live with in the future. “If the 
future must treat what we do now as presumptively binding, 
then our current decision must judge not only what is best for 
now, but also how the current decision will affect the decision of 
 
 25. For a discussion of the “argument from fairness,” see Schauer, supra 
note 2, at 595–97. 
 26. For a discussion of the predictability argument, see id. at 597–98. 
 27. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 28. See Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 
494 (1987) (“[S]tare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.”). 
 29. This may even be true if the decision is unsupported by explanation: 
[A]wareness of the future effect of today’s decision pervades legal and 
nonlegal argument. Lawyers and others routinely deploy a battery of 
metaphors—the slippery slope, the parade of horribles, the floodgates, 
the foot in the door, and the entering wedge are but a few—to urge 
decisionmakers to consider the future effect of today’s decisions. Un-
dergirding each of these metaphors is the belief that even an unchar-
acterized precedent can influence the future. 
Schauer, supra note 2, at 574. 
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other . . . cases.”30 It is in this sense that “neutral principles” 
are important to judicial opinions. Thus, respect for precedent 
pushes judges to seek generality and coherence in their deci-
sions. 
B. BEDROCK PRECEDENTS 
At least in certain kinds of cases, precedent gains added 
importance in the constitutional area. One purpose of having a 
written constitution is to create a stable framework for gov-
ernment.31 This goal would be undermined if the Court failed to 
give special credence to bedrock precedents—precedents that 
have become the foundation for large areas of important doc-
trine. Some obvious examples involve the rulings of the New 
Deal era upholding the validity of the Social Security system 
and other federal taxing and spending programs, and those 
recognizing federal jurisdiction over the economy. These ome-
lettes cannot be unscrambled today, as even some devoted be-
lievers in originalism acknowledge.32 Likewise, it is far too late 
in the day to invalidate independent agencies, as some original-
ists would like,33 or to undo the twentieth century rulings that 
“incorporated” the Bill of Rights and made it applicable to the 
states, or to reconsider the constitutionality of segregation. 
It is not simply that it would be imprudent to overrule 
these doctrines, though obviously it would be. But in an impor-
tant sense, it would run against the purposes of constitutional-
 
 30. Id. at 589. 
 31. Schauer suggests that stability is a particularly important value for 
law: 
Perhaps we should view legal institutions, including lawyers and law 
schools, as part of a larger mechanism—call it society—that needs 
some institutions that are creative, speculative, adaptive, and risk-
taking, and other institutions that are cautious, predictable, and risk 
averse. These latter institutions might act as stabilizers and brakes, 
rather than as engines and accelerators, and it may be that both 
forms of institution together constitute, or at least approach, the ideal 
mix of decisionmaking structures. Within this mix of structures it 
should be apparent that precedent, as an inherently constraining 
form of argument, is more suited to some forms of decision than to 
others. 
Id. at 604–05. 
 32. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE-
DUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 723–24. 
 33. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post–New Deal administrative state is 
unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing 
less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.”). 
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ism. Overruling these doctrines would create just the kind of 
uncertainty and instability that constitutions (even more than 
other laws) are designed to avoid: 
Stability and continuity of political institutions (and of shared values) 
are important goals of the process of constitutional adjudication, par-
ticularly “in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” 
Moreover, these values are in part at least among the values that the 
new constitutional order was specifically designed to secure, as the 
Preamble to the Constitution itself makes plain. Indeed, the Federal-
ist No. 49 even decried appeals to the people in order to “maintain[] 
the constitutional equilibrum of government.”34 
Legitimate or not, these modern constitutional doctrines 
are here to stay as a realistic matter. Plenary federal power 
over fiscal and economic matters, independent agencies, and 
application of the Bill of Rights to the states are now integral 
parts of our system of government; in some ways, they are more 
“constitutional” than some of the more obscure parts of the 
written Constitution. Consider the following question: Which 
would be more shocking, a Supreme Court decision invalidating 
the Social Security system, or one upholding a requirement to 
rent vacant rooms to soldiers in peacetime? Yet the Third 
Amendment speaks plainly to the latter situation, in a way 
that cannot be said of Social Security. 
Along these lines, one of the most vehement critics of stare 
decisis in the Reagan era allowed for an exception when over-
ruling a precedent would cause a national crisis. “Surely,” he 
said, “a judge need not vote to overrule an erroneous precedent 
if to do so would pitch the country into the abyss—if . . . it 
would be on the order of killing the body to save a limb.”35 He 
pointed to the Legal Tender Cases,36 which upheld the constitu-
tionality of paper money,37 as an apt example.38 And admit-
tedly, whatever the Framers might have thought about the 
matter, it is hard to see how a modern economy could survive if 
 
 34. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 748–49 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) and THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 341 (James 
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 35. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 410 (1988). Cooper was the As-
sistant Attorney General heading the Office of Legal Counsel at the time. Id. 
at 401. Interestingly, the article does not contain the customary disclaimer of 
nonofficial status: “The views expressed here are solely those of the author.” 
 36. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). 
 37. Id. at 540–44. 
 38. Cooper, supra note 35, at 410. 
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only metal coins could be used as a medium of exchange. 
The example of paper money also suggests another reason 
for respecting bedrock precedents. Imagine that the Supreme 
Court did overrule itself and held that only coins could be con-
stitutionally used as a medium of exchange. One possible result 
would be an immediate economic crisis, especially given the 
widespread use of American currency abroad. But perhaps such 
a crisis would not occur if the political system responded 
quickly enough. Maybe Congress and the states could drop all 
other business to pass an immediate constitutional amend-
ment. Or some ingenious solution could be adopted to support a 
modern economy while restricting “money” to metal coinage, 
such as creating a computerized barter system that would 
minimize the need to use money at all. Still, even assuming a 
happy ending, the issue would necessarily consume the public 
agenda until Congress implemented the solution. Thus, the 
Court would have preempted legislative attention from other, 
more urgent social problems. Should curing a possible error in 
an 1870 case really push off the legislative agenda such current 
issues as the Iraq War, rebuilding the Gulf after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, or the threat of terrorism? Preempting the 
normal process of government for such a purpose seems mis-
guided, to say the least. 
Virtually everyone, including nearly all originalists, ac-
knowledge that certain precedents cannot be undone. Robert 
Bork, for instance, concedes that some judicial practices are “so 
accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and pub-
lic expectations of individuals and institutions” as to be im-
mune from judicial revision.39 But the significance of this point 
should not be underestimated. Unlike the doctrine of adverse 
possession in property law, which is peripheral to the system of 
property ownership, stare decisis in constitutional law changes 
the nature of the enterprise.40 Bedrock precedents cannot be 
quarantined; instead, they inevitably affect the system of con-
stitutional law as a whole. 
 
 39. BORK, supra note 32, at 158. 
 40. For analogies between adverse possession and stare decisis, see Tyler 
Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 
232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gary 
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 23, 33 (1994) (“If judges are going to continue to employ precedent, there 
is value in acknowledging that the practice is nothing more than ‘a sort of in-
tellectual adverse possession’—and that the territory adversely possessed is 
nothing less than the Constitution.”). 
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The originalist impulse regarding these bedrock but alleg-
edly “wrong” precedents is to say “this far, but not an inch far-
ther.” Under this view, the court should not overrule key prece-
dents, but it should always return to first principles in 
considering new issues. But this is an untenable stance in a le-
gal system that seeks some form of coherence. What sense does 
it make to say that Congress may give legal sanction to paper 
money but not to electronic transfers? What sense would it 
make to say that Social Security is constitutional, but that ex-
panding the program to cover expenses for prescription drugs 
or transforming it into a program of private accounts would not 
be? Or to try to limit the racial equality principle of Brown v. 
Board of Education to the Jim Crow laws of the 1950s? 
 A sensible legal system can tolerate having a few small 
patches of doctrine retained because of practical imperatives 
but rejected in principle.41 But a legal system in which huge 
swathes of the law are considered unprincipled, while small 
corners are governed by principle, makes no sense at all. Bed-
rock rulings cannot be “limited to their facts” if the legal system 
is to have any claim to integrity; rather, they must be given 
generative force as precedents.42 
Adherence to precedent does not mean simply refusing to 
overrule past decisions—it means taking them seriously as 
starting points for analysis in future cases. This notion derives 
partly from reasoning by analogy based on similarities between 
the facts of cases, but more importantly, it reflects a need to 
give credence to the reasoning in earlier opinions. The willing-
ness of judges to defer in this way to their predecessors—and 
their expectation of similar deference from their successors—
transforms the Court from an ever-changing collection of indi-
vidual judges to an institution capable of building a continuing 
body of law rather than merely a succession of one-time rul-
ings. This kind of decision making, which is familiar to stu-
dents of the common law system,43 is structured enough to pro-
 
 41. For example, Monaghan suggests that Roe might fall into this cate-
gory. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 759. 
 42. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of 
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006) (manuscript at 4, on 
file with author) (arguing that precedent necessarily takes on a life of its own, 
corrupting the purity of interpretative theories). 
 43. As one legal philosopher has put it, 
Given all the strange twists and turns of common law reasoning, one 
might be tempted to conclude that this seems an utterly bizarre way 
to run a legal system, were it not for the fact that common law rea-
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vide stability and coherence, but flexible enough to allow im-
provisation and growth.44 
Like the common law, constitutional law is able to grow 
and change because of its reliance on precedent, and as with 
the common law, these changes generally occur incrementally. 
We should resist, however, a simple equation between the 
common law and constitutional law. Constitutional law does 
not rely purely on judicial precedents in the same way as the 
common law.45 In particular, as we will see in the next section, 
other forms of constitutional history also play an important 
role. 
C. NONJUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 
Nonjudicial precedents can also play a significant role in 
constitutional law. Perhaps the best illustration involves the 
scope of executive power. As this example shows, respect for 
precedent need not be based on judge-worship. A consistent line 
of interpretation by Congress and the President is also deserv-
ing of respect.46 
The extent of executive power is hotly disputed,47 so what 
is presented here will be a set of conclusions rather than a full-
fledged argument on the subject. On a fair reading, the histori-
cal record fails to settle what the Framers meant by the “execu-
tive power” or how that phrase related to specific grants of 
 
soning seems to reflect at a more public level the way people develop 
their own moral principles and views on life. 
BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 149 (3d ed. 2004). 
 44. The analogy between common law and constitutional law has been 
most fully explored by David Strauss. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common 
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003). 
 45. Documents such as the Federalist papers seem to be given something 
of the same weight as judicial precedents. Moreover, the text is not a negligi-
ble factor, though it does not always seem to trust the weight of subsequent 
practice. For an example of the latter, consider the constitutional requirement 
that the Senate give “Advice and Consent” to treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 
(emphasis added). When was the last time a President ever asked for the Sen-
ate’s prior advice about a possible treaty? 
 46. Randy Barnett’s Response seems to indicate a degree of agreement 
with this view. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super-
precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006). 
 47. The reader who cannot resist the temptation to delve further would do 
well to consult Steven Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial 
Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994); Lawson, supra 
note 33; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
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presidential power. As Justice Robert Jackson said in a famous 
opinion on presidential power, “Just what our forefathers did 
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern 
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic 
as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Phar-
aoh.”48 He added that a “century and a half”—today, two centu-
ries—“of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no 
net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from 
respected sources on each side of any question.”49 It is an exag-
geration to say that the historical record teaches us nothing, 
but it clearly fails to provide any precise guidance about the 
boundaries of presidential power.50 
As Madison recognized at the time, there is no way of de-
ducing the precise limits of executive power from general prin-
ciples. In Federalist No. 37, he said, “Experience has instructed 
us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able 
to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three 
great provinces—the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or 
even the privileges and powers of the different legislative 
 
 48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. at 634–35. The history, of course, is controversial, and the debate 
is far too complex to enter into here. My own views are close to those ex-
pressed in Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 
1725 (1996) (arguing that history does not support many of today’s formalist 
assumptions in this area). Even those who believe that history and text theo-
retically provide a definitive answer about presidential power must concede 
that in practice they have failed to do so. 
 50. This is not to say that presidential power was a complete constitu-
tional cipher. The specific grants of power to the President, as well as related 
grants of power to Congress in military and foreign affairs, give some guid-
ance. The Framers built on a history of disputes about executive power. We 
know that they considered the postrevolutionary governors too weak. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 140–45 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(discussing the problems with the Articles of Confederation). We also know 
that they considered the prerevolutionary governors and the English monarch 
too strong. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 396–402 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (comparing the President with the King of Eng-
land). Like Goldilocks, they wanted something that was “not too strong” and 
“not too weak” but “just right.” They wanted as much executive energy and 
initiative as possible without upsetting the proper balance of republican gov-
ernment. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 435–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (arguing that the President has as much energy “as Re-
publican principles will admit” without compromising his accountability). But 
these principles were too general to resolve hard cases. Thus, when particular 
questions about executive power arise, text and original understanding can 
provide only limited guidance. 
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branches.”51 He sagely added that “[a]ll new laws, though 
penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the full-
est and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or 
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated 
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adju-
dications.”52 
The difficulty, then, lies in finding the right balance be-
tween energy and efficiency, on the one hand, and legal re-
straint on the other. The President must be free to respond to 
emergencies, but not too free, lest the category of emergency ac-
tion swallow up too much of public policy and individual lib-
erty. Deductive logic cannot set this balance. Somehow, we 
have managed over the course of our history to find an accept-
able balance, and the best the Court can do is to try to main-
tain that balance. It is for this reason that the Steel Seizure 
case, the leading authority on presidential power, puts so much 
stress on the practical accommodations reached between Con-
gress and the President over the years.53 
Nonjudicial precedents, like settled practice by the other 
branches, are important for the present discussion because 
they illustrate the pull of precedent even outside of the courts. 
Consideration of nonjudicial precedents also reinforces the sig-
nificance of bedrock precedents. The post–New Deal under-
standing of federal power received the support of the President 
and Congress over a long period of time. So has the racial inte-
gration mandate of Brown, which was stirringly endorsed by 
Congress and the President in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 
These actions by the “democratic branches” rebuff any argu-
ment that these precedents represent a judicial power grab, 
and such actions thereby help place the precedents’ legitimacy 
beyond question. 
II.  ORIGINALISM AND STARE DECISIS 
Reliance on precedent seems to be here to stay, as even its 
fiercest critics regretfully concede. But this does not answer the 
 
 51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 244 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
 52. Id. at 245. 
 53. See Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952), which provided the analytic framework 
for Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
FARBER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:11:10 AM 
2006] RULE OF LAW & LAW OF PRECEDENTS 1187 
 
question of whether we should view stare decisis as strengthen-
ing or weakening the rule of law. Federalist No. 78 says that 
“[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispen-
sable that they should be bound down by strict rules and prece-
dents . . . .”55 Yet stare decisis has also been attacked for being 
a source of undue discretion. As one critic put it, stare decisis 
“is inherently subjective, and few judges, including Supreme 
Court Justices, can resist the natural temptation to manipulate 
it.”56 
For originalists, stare decisis seems in tension with the 
paramount status of the written Constitution. As one critic 
says, “If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision 
says Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to 
prefer the Constitution.”57 Or as another critic has said, “[N]o 
court should ever deliberately adhere to what it is fully per-
suaded are the erroneous constitutional decisions of the past. 
To do so is to act in deliberate violation of the Constitution.”58 
It is easy to understand the dissatisfaction of originalists with 
stare decisis. By allowing the views of five Justices to displace 
the “true” meaning of the Constitution, stare decisis seems to 
authorize a covert form of constitutional amendment. At the 
same time, it elevates the mistaken views of five individuals 
above the true meaning of the law, thereby in a sense replacing 
the rule of law with the “rule of men.” Or so it appears to some 
originalists. 
Rejection of stare decisis, while appealing to originalists, 
poses a practical problem for them, most clearly in the instance 
of the bedrock precedents discussed earlier. It also presents a 
bit of a political problem to the extent they are forced to treat 
just rulings such as Brown like unwelcome house guests, who 
should never have been allowed admission but can no longer be 
 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kram-
nick ed., 1987). 
 56. Cooper, supra note 35, at 404. 
 57. Lawson, supra note 40, at 27–28. As Lawson puts it,  
If a statue, enacted with all of the majestic formalities for lawmaking 
prescribed by the Constitution, and stamped with the imprimatur of 
representative democracy, cannot legitimately be given effect in an 
adjudication when it conflicts with the Constitution, how can a mere 
judicial decision possibly have a greater legal status? 
Id. at 27. Thus, he says, “What’s sauce for the legislative or executive goose is 
also sauce for the judicial gander.” Id. at 28. 
 58. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of 
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third 
Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 681 (1995). 
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evicted. On a deeper level, rejection of stare decisis presents a 
theoretical conundrum for originalism. Although the two are 
not necessarily linked, originalism in practice is linked with a 
type of formalism that celebrates the value of clear rules. Jus-
tice Scalia, the leading proponent of originalism, provides the 
best illustration of the claim that originalism depoliticizes con-
stitutional law by providing a more rule-like framework. 
Even a cursory acquaintance with Justice Scalia’s opinions 
reveals his passion for order and logic.59 As one leading consti-
tutional scholar has said, “for Justice Scalia, the rule’s the 
thing; originalism and traditionalism are means, not ends.”60 
She goes on to observe what she calls “the codifier at work”: 
[F]irst, state the general rule; second, rationalize the existing messy 
pattern of cases by grandfathering in a few exceptions and doing the 
best you can to cabin their reach; and third, anticipate future cases in 
which the rule might be thought problematic and dispose of them in 
advance by writing sub-paragraphs and sub-sub-paragraphs qualify-
ing the rule with clauses beginning with ‘unless’ or ‘except.’61 
This passion for rules is tied to Scalia’s desire for consistency, 
which he views as the first of all legal virtues, the “very founda-
tion of the rule of law.”62 
Because of his desire for clarity, certainty, and consistency, 
Justice Scalia has mixed feelings about the common law. He is 
uneasy about the common law process, in which law grows, 
“not through the pronouncement of general principles, but case-
 
 59. For an overview of Scalia’s jurisprudential thinking, combined with 
some speculation about its biographical origins, see George Kannar, The Con-
stitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990). For recent 
critiques of Scalia’s jurisprudence, see Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Jus-
tice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529 (1997) (reviewing AN-
TONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).  
 60. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 78 (1992). 
 61. Id. at 87. 
 62. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 588 (1989–90). Consistency is even more important 
in the work of judges than it is for legislators and administrators: 
Besides its centrality to the rule of law in general, consistency has a 
special role to play in judge-made law . . . . The only checks on the ar-
bitrariness of federal judges are the insistence upon consistency and 
the application of the teachings of the mother of consistency, logic. . . . 
[C]ourts apply to each case a system of abstract and entirely fictional 
categories developed in earlier cases, which are designed, if logically 
applied, to produce “fair” or textually faithful results. 
 Id. at 588–89. 
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by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time.”63 But 
the common law process is inherently inconsistent with the 
ideal judicial role, according to Scalia: only by announcing and 
following clear rules can judicial decisions merit respect, and 
only so can they provide certainty, limit future judicial discre-
tion, and provide uniformity.64 Indeed, he maintains, judges 
who do not provide abstract rules but instead rely on the total-
ity of the circumstances, are “not so much pronouncing the law 
in the normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of 
fact-finding.”65 
No wonder another leading advocate of the “law of rules” 
was moved to ask whether the common law qualifies as law at 
all.66 Indeed, Scalia himself seems to view the common law 
with some suspicion, and he regrets that it receives so much at-
tention in law schools. Because law school begins by studying 
the common law, he says, the students’ “image of the great 
judge—the Holmes, the Cardozo” is one “who has the intelli-
gence to discern the best rule of law for the case at hand and 
then the skill to perform the broken-field running through ear-
lier cases that leaves him free to impose that rule.”67 The judge 
manages this task by “distinguishing one prior case on the left, 
straight-arming another one on the right, high-stepping away 
from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until 
(bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law.”68 
Thus, in an ideal world, where the Court was not already 
hemmed in by precedents, the right approach would apparently 
be to base every decision solely on the original meaning of the 
Constitution. It is easy to see, however, that this would result 
in the loss of such virtues as stability, consistency, and clar-
ity—the very virtues that the law of rules is supposed to pro-
mote. On the contrary, to achieve the Scalian vision of the rule 
of law, originalists also need stare decisis to protect the deci-
sions of today’s originalists against their successors. 
 
 63. Scalia, supra note 27, at 1177. 
 64. See id. at 1178–79. 
 65. Id. at 1180–81. On Scalia’s views regarding the importance of rules, 
see id. at 1176, 1178, 1181. I return to Scalia’s views about the power of indi-
vidual rulings to “legislate” rules of law later in this Essay. See infra notes 
119–23 and accompanying text. 
 66. Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455 
(1989) (reviewing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 
(1988)). 
 67. SCALIA, supra note 59, at 9. 
 68. Id. 
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There is no reason to expect originalism, unaided by stare 
decisis, to lead to a stable, definitive set of answers to constitu-
tional questions. To begin with, views of history, even by pro-
fessional historians, are subject to revision over time.69 Shifts 
in constitutional interpretation would reflect these histo-
riographical views. To take the example discussed earlier, 
views of the executive power in the framing period may change 
among historians; so unvarnished originalism would result in 
the waxing and waning of presidential authority along with the 
latest trends in history departments. 
Even among like-minded judges, difficult cases will inevi-
tably arise, where the original meaning of the constitutional 
provision is debatable in its application. These cases may turn 
on the basis of a single judicial vote, and will therefore be sub-
ject to revision whenever a Justice approaches the issue anew. 
Judges are not clones, and originalist judges with different po-
litical inclinations will, despite their best efforts at objectivity, 
be influenced on occasion by their preconceptions. This would 
remain true even if all of the judges were “conservatives” be-
cause some might be social conservatives, while others might 
be libertarians. Such individuals could subscribe to strikingly 
different interpretations of original meaning. Indeed, one re-
cent defense of textualism (as opposed to precedent) comes per-
ilously close to admitting that the constitutional text has often 
functioned historically merely to provide an excuse for politi-
cally motivated decisions by the Court.70 
Even assuming the absence of any ideological divisions 
whatsoever, judges could still have methodological divisions. 
For example, some judges might find the Federalist papers a 
more persuasive source of evidence than other documents, or at 
an even finer level of detail, some might view Madison as more 
reliable than Hamilton, or vice versa. When these methodologi-
cal differences became outcome determinative, the Court’s rul-
ings would be no more predictable or consistent than they are 
today when precedent is ignored. Jurists might also differ in 
 
 69. For a discussion of this problem, see Emil A. Kleinhaus, History as 
Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
121, 125–28 (2000). 
 70. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: 
Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 686 (2006) (“In launching 
these new doctrines, the Court sometimes lies about its precedents . . . . As I 
argued above, the Court has also often used the rhetoric of textualism or 
originalism in major cases to displace what it thought were wayward practices 
or precedents.”). 
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terms of the level of generality with which they defined the 
original understanding. Again, inconsistent outcomes would re-
sult, depending on the identity of the judges and how their 
methodological positions aligned with substantive outcomes in 
specific cases. Even in the most pristinely originalist judiciary, 
conflicts would still exist between different schools of original-
ism. Without stare decisis, these methodological disputes would 
never be settled definitively. 
Some textualists view elaborate recourse to history as un-
necessary because they view the text itself as clear.71 They 
seem unfazed by the fact that people have been arguing for 
decades (and in some cases for centuries) about the meaning of 
phrases such as “the executive power,” “due process of law,” 
and “equal protection.”72 Perhaps each textualist simply as-
sumes that judges will inevitably adopt his or her own pre-
ferred reading of these phrases. What textualism promises is 
not consensus but a cacophony of confident proclamations 
about the plain meaning of the document. Expecting these dis-
putes to be miraculously settled, when they have existed for 
such long periods, is simply unrealistic. 
Legal clarity would also suffer from unalloyed originalism. 
True, individual opinions might lay down clear rules of law 
based on interpretations of original meaning. But different 
judges on the same court could well articulate different “clear 
rules,” and today’s clear rules might not be those followed in 
tomorrow’s opinions. In practice, if the law at any one time con-
sists of overlapping versions of different Justices’ clear rules, or 
if the rules mutate over time, this “rule-based” approach might 
be incapable of creating clear law. 
The rule-of-law deficiencies of originalism are clearest 
when originalists disclaim any belief in precedent. But the 
problem also arises in more nuanced versions, as exemplified 
by a recent argument that precedent can continue to play a vi-
tal role for originalists.73 On this view, clear constitutional 
 
 71. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 59, at 38. 
 72. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 389–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (debating the scope of executive power as allocated under 
the Constitution); Strauss, supra note 44, at 1718 (posing the problem of why 
original understanding matters to the interpretation of constitutional provi-
sions such as the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause). 
 73. See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: 
Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006) 
(manuscript at 13), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_ 
files/BarnettR050205.pdf. 
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meaning remains controlling and precedent is, to that extent, 
irrelevant. But when original constitutional meaning is vague, 
precedent may govern application to specific cases so long as 
those precedents are not inconsistent with original meaning. 
Moreover, practice can settle the meaning of ambiguous provi-
sions, and sufficiently strong reliance interests can block re-
course to original meaning. 
This more nuanced version of originalism does not, how-
ever, avoid the problem of instability. Without stare decisis, 
there will be no stability at the “meta” level: in determining 
which constitutional provisions are vague or the extent of their 
vagueness, in locating ambiguity, or in deciding whether one 
interpretation implements original meaning more faithfully 
than another. Different judges applying the same basic ap-
proach to interpretation will reach different conclusions about 
when meaning is vague or ambiguous and about the extent of 
the permissible leeway in interpretation. These differences will 
produce interesting theoretical debates on the bench but little 
in the way of reliable law. 
This proposal essentially amounts to giving the Supreme 
Court the scope of authority in interpreting the Constitution 
similar to what the Chevron doctrine gives agencies in inter-
preting statutes.74 Under Chevron, roughly speaking, a court 
will uphold an agency interpretation of the statute if it is a rea-
sonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.75 
Yet the Chevron doctrine would rest on slippery foundations if 
every application of the doctrine by the courts were subject to 
de novo reconsideration. Questions of how to apply Chevron in 
particular settings are often difficult and divisive, and the same 
would be true for the proposed scheme. The statute that looks 
unambiguous to one judge is utterly opaque to another. Simi-
larly, judges will predictably differ in their views about the 
analogous issues in constitutional interpretation, producing 
wobbling legal interpretations. For the scheme to provide legal 
stability, it needs to be backed with second-level stare decisis, 
in the same way that judicial decisions applying the Chevron 
 
 74. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984) (“Considerable weight should be accorded to an executive de-
partment’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to adminis-
ter . . . .”). For some complications regarding the scope of the doctrine, see 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that Chev-
ron applies only when agency action has the force of law and that other agency 
actions may receive some lesser degree of deference). 
 75. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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doctrine must be binding precedents. Otherwise, the borderline 
cases would remain forever unsettled, with no one quite sure 
whether an interpretation that was acceptable yesterday would 
remain there tomorrow, or instead would be found to be in ten-
sion with the text. 
The dependency of formalism on stare decisis surfaces 
most strikingly in Justice Scalia’s writings. Justice Scalia has 
been, on the whole, no fan of stare decisis. Yet he also believes 
in the primacy of rules in judicial decisions: 
[W]hen in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, 
and say, “This is the basis of our decision,” I not only constrain lower 
courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such 
different facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the 
outcome are quite the opposite, I will be unable to indulge those pref-
erences; I have committed myself to the governing principle. . . . Only 
by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.76 
Of course, an individual judge might always feel some reluc-
tance to stray from his own prior pronouncements, but note 
that Justice Scalia is speaking here only of the cases in which 
he writes for the majority. Thus, he is bound by the previous 
decision not only by personal embarrassment over changing his 
mind, but because the Court’s pronouncements are binding 
rules of law. Otherwise, it would not matter whether he was 
“writing for the majority of the Court” or dissenting alone. In-
deed, the whole point of the article in which he wrote those 
words was that law ought, whenever possible, to consist of 
binding rules. 
Yet, without stare decisis, the Court’s pronouncements—
even when grounded in a vision of original meaning—could not 
possibly constitute a rule binding on the Justices in the future, 
but would only be, at most, a revocable command to the lower 
courts. Lower court judges themselves would hardly be moti-
vated to follow these temporary promulgations to the letter, 
knowing that whether their decisions were affirmed or reversed 
would depend instead on a de novo investigation by the Su-
preme Court of each new case as it arose. 
Thus, even if we could somehow miraculously rewind the 
clock and ensure that every Justice in history practiced the 
most currently trendy form of originalism, we would still find 
that we needed stare decisis—if not for legal issues, then at 
least for the specific tenets of originalist methodology and their 
application in critical disputes cases. 
 
 76. Scalia, supra note 27, at 1179–80. 
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III.  PRECEDENT AND LEGITIMACY: 
THE CASE OF ABORTION 
Discussing stare decisis today without mentioning Casey77 
is like presenting Hamlet without Hamlet—or, some might say, 
Harry Potter without the evil Voldemort. Casey is by far the 
most notable and controversial application of the doctrine in re-
cent years. In part, this is because the Court’s willingness to 
stand by precedent came as such a surprise. After all, in words 
of one sage observer, “The last thing one would have expected 
the Rehnquist Court to do was to reaffirm Roe v. Wade.”78 
Casey is notable because of its very self-conscious applica-
tion of stare decisis. In particular, the Casey opinion by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter79 placed considerable stress on 
the notion that part of Roe was entitled to special precedential 
force.80 To understand Casey, it is important to keep in mind 
that this enhanced version of stare decisis was applied only to 
one part of Roe. This was the “central holding” that “viability 
marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal 
life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on 
nontherapeutic abortions.”81 According to Casey, the only de-
batable aspect of that holding was the “strength of the state in-
terest in fetal protection,” not “the recognition afforded by the 
Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”82 Thus, the Casey Court 
 
 77. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (de-
clining to overrule the “central holding” of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 
(1973)). 
 78. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Con-
servative Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 
67, 67 (1993). For other discussions of stare decisis and the abortion issue, see 
William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare 
Decisis: Casey, Dickerson, and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 
2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 81–89; Dawn Johnsen, Abortion: A Mixed and Unset-
tled Legacy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 301, 303 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006). On 
Rehnquist’s own view of stare decisis, see Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife 
Fight: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RUTGERS 
L.J. 669 (1994). 
 79. This portion of their joint opinion represented a majority of the Court. 
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
 80. Id. at 869. On the “normal” factors to be considered in determining 
whether to overrule a case, see Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare 
Decisis and the Overruling of National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 
341, 342–45 (1985); Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: 
Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 123 (1985). 
Those factors are discussed in the Casey opinion, 505 U.S. at 854–61. 
 81. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. 
 82. Id. at 858. 
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relied on stare decisis to shore up its finding that the interest 
in fetal life is insufficiently compelling to overcome a woman’s 
fundamental right. 
The Casey opinion emphasized: 
[The] Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people 
to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as 
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and po-
litical pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices 
that the Court is obliged to make.83 
Hence, “the Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally prin-
cipled decisions under circumstances in which their principled 
character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Na-
tion.”84 
The Court then explained why, in its view, overruling Roe’s 
holding about fetal life would impair judicial legitimacy: 
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a 
case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive contro-
versy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision 
has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. 
It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to 
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in 
the Constitution.85 
In such circumstances, the Court said, “to overrule under fire in 
the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a wa-
tershed decision” would appear simply to be “a surrender to po-
litical pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle 
on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance.”86 
The main dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took 
quite another view. “Our constitutional watch,” Rehnquist said, 
“does not cease merely because we have spoken before on an is-
sue; when it becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpre-
tation is unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question.”87 
“[J]ust as the Court should not respond to [public] protest by 
retreating from the decision simply to allay the concerns of the 
protesters, it should likewise not respond by determining to 
adhere to the decision at all costs lest it seem to be retreating 
under fire.”88 Justice Scalia was even more forthright: “I cannot 
 
 83. Id. at 865–66. 
 84. Id. at 866. 
 85. Id. at 866–67. 
 86. Id. at 867. 
 87. Id. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 959–60. 
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agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court’s suggestion 
that the decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitu-
tional decision must be strongly influenced—against overruling 
no less—by the substantial and continuing public opposition 
the decision has generated.”89 Justice Scalia said, “Indeed, the 
notion that we would decide a case differently from the way we 
otherwise would have in order to show that we can stand firm 
against public disapproval is frightening.”90 
Even before the Court’s reaffirmation of Roe in Casey, 
Henry Monaghan, a leading scholar of conservative bent had 
argued that “Roe provides a ready example” of why “departure 
from precedent may sometimes threaten the stability and con-
tinuity of the political order and should therefore be avoided.”91 
More generally, he argued, “[A]dherence to precedent can con-
tribute to the important notion that the law is impersonal in 
character, that the Court believes itself to be following a ‘law 
which binds [it] as well as the litigants.’”92 For, he said, the 
Court’s “institutional position would be weakened were it gen-
erally perceived that the Court itself views its own decisions as 
little more than ‘a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day 
and train only.’”93 The question then is whether “judicial self-
protection is a legitimate criterion that should be taken into ac-
count in deciding whether to adhere to a challenged prece-
dent,”94 a question Monaghan tentatively answered in the af-
firmative.95 
Under this view, deviation from precedent may cast doubt 
on the Court’s integrity, particularly when the precedent has 
come under heavy political fire. Indeed, for some Justices, this 
may be more than just a question of institutional stature. A 
 
 89. Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 751. 
 92. Id. at 752 (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 50 (1976)). 
 93. Id. at 753 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting)). 
 94. Id. at 762. 
 95. Id. at 763. Monaghan reached this conclusion partly because he 
thought it was almost inevitable that judges would consider this factor, and 
partly because political protection for the Court is closely related to the need 
to maintain the Court’s legitimacy. Id. Compare this view with Schauer’s as-
sertion that “[i]f internal consistency strengthens external credibility, then 
minimizing internal inconsistency by standardizing decisions within a deci-
sionmaking environment may generally strengthen that decisionmaking envi-
ronment as an institution.” Schauer, supra note 2, at 600. 
FARBER_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:11:10 AM 
2006] RULE OF LAW & LAW OF PRECEDENTS 1197 
 
plausible suggestion is that in authoring the joint opinion in 
Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter were “con-
cerned, perhaps above all else, with public perceptions of their 
personal integrity: They wanted to make it clear that their 
votes were never precommitted to overruling Roe.”96 
Yet, such reference to political factors in applying stare de-
cisis is also troubling. Apart from the empirical question of 
whether the Court’s public legitimacy would indeed be threat-
ened by a reversal of course, it is paradoxical to give the most 
controversial decisions additional precedential weight. For, the 
more questionable a decision and the more contrary to public 
opinion, the more the Court would cling to it. 
One could argue with at least equal justice that heated 
public controversy should lead the Court to reconsider its con-
stitutional position with particular care. Such controversy 
demonstrates that the issue is one where the political process 
might well reach conclusions at odds with the Court’s, making 
more crucial the question of whether to block that process. Fur-
thermore, political controversy may be a sign that the societal 
stakes are high, so that an error is especially undesirable. Un-
derstandably, individual Justices may be troubled by the per-
ception that they are acting in response to political pressure or 
to undisclosed commitments to the Presidents who appointed 
them. The proper response, however, is for those Justices to 
consider the merits of the case with particular care, to guard 
against any unconscious influences from political pressures one 
way or the other, and then to explain their reasoning with clar-
ity to the public.97 
On the whole, Casey seems to have gone too far in its ar-
gument for giving special weight to precedents such as Roe. 
This did not mean that stare decisis was irrelevant in Casey. 
Despite the Casey Court’s inflated description of stare decisis 
as applied to the case before it,98 it is important to note the lim-
ited way in which Casey actually applies stare decisis. On per-
haps the most fundamental question before it, whether liberty 
 
 96. Paulsen, supra note 24, at 1551. Historians will be in a better position 
to judge the truth of this assertion, but it does not seem at all implausible that 
concerns about personal integrity played a role. No Supreme Court Justice 
wants to be seen as a mere toady to the President who made the appointment. 
 97. Roe does not quite fit the category of bedrock precedents, given its 
relatively recent vintage, its limited subject matter, and its continuing rejec-
tion by substantial minorities on the Court. 
 98. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–79 (1992). 
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encompasses a woman’s decision to carry or not carry a preg-
nancy to term, the Court did not rely on stare decisis. The Ca-
sey Court’s view was that women’s reproductive autonomy is 
constitutionally protected, not simply because previous prece-
dents had said so, but because that was actually the best inter-
pretation of the Constitution.99 If, as Justice Scalia and others 
have argued, this aspect of Roe had been based on a completely 
unfounded conception of constitutional liberty,100 respect for 
the Roe opinion should not have been enough to save it. But the 
Court did not agree on the merits of that constitutional issue 
with the dissenters, regardless of precedent.101 
Rather, the Court applied stare decisis only to the subsidi-
ary holding in Roe that the state’s interest was insufficiently 
compelling to justify a complete ban on abortion.102 Here, stare 
decisis seems to have a greater rule. Determining the weight of 
a government interest inevitably involves an element of judg-
ment. The fact that many Justices over a prolonged period of 
time have assessed an interest as noncompelling makes that 
judgment more plausible. Perhaps not plausible enough to sur-
vive if a Justice was unshakably convinced to the contrary, but 
at least plausible enough to be entitled to the benefit of the 
doubt. Thus, the way the Casey Court actually deployed stare 
decisis was a good deal sounder than some of the rhetoric the 
Court used to describe what it was doing. 
IV.  APPLYING PRECEDENTS 
The Casey Court’s treatment of precedent was disputed for 
reasons going beyond its refusal to overrule the “central hold-
ing” of Roe. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent berated the ma-
jority for claiming to be following Roe, while in reality deviating 
in critical respects, particularly through a rejection of Roe’s 
trimester system.103 Rehnquist wrote: 
 
 
 99. See id. at 846–54. 
 100. Id. at 979–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 846–53 (majority opinion). Nevertheless, it is significant that 
this aspect of Roe was rooted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(striking down a ban on contraceptives), which does seem to have acquired ca-
nonical status. 
 102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–73. 
 103. See id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Actually, Roe’s trimester 
system had eroded well before Casey. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, 
Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with the 1980’s “Reasonableness” 
Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 522–23 (1990). 
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Stare decisis is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as meaning “to 
abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” Whatever the “central holding” 
of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes dissecting it is surely 
not the result of that principle. While purporting to adhere to prece-
dent, the joint opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but 
only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere fa-
cade to give the illusion of reality.104 
It is one thing to say that a precedent should be followed. It 
is another to say precisely what it means to follow precedent.105 
This is not an easy question to answer. As a writer of an earlier 
generation remarked, “Yet when one asks, how does one deter-
mine the legal significance of judicial precedents?—one finds 
only fragmentary answers in authoritative materials and no 
entirely satisfactory theory offered by the writers who have 
dealt with the subject.”106 That seems to remain true today. 
In various legal systems, precedent may be used as the ba-
sis for an analogy, or seen as exemplifying a general principle, 
or as establishing a binding rule.107 Anglo-American law has 
also been unclear: “The precedent has been viewed as limited to 
the ‘decision’ on the ‘material facts’ as seen by the precedent 
court, or the same as seen by the nonprecedent court; for oth-
ers, the term means the ‘rules’ formulated by the precedent 
court; for still others, the term includes the reasons given for 
the rules formulated.”108 
In rough terms, the dispute over the treatment of prece-
dent can be seen in the familiar distinction between legal rules 
and standards.109 This distinction itself is not razor sharp, but 
the gist can be seen by comparing “do not exceed 65 m.p.h.” (a 
rule) with “do not drive faster than conditions allow” (a stan-
dard). Thus, the Wisconsin Interstate’s speed limit is a rule; the 
Autobahn follows a standard. 
 
 104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 105. For some reflections on this issue, see Maltz, supra note 2, at 376–83; 
Neil MacCormick, The Significance of Precedent, 1988 ACTA JURIDICA 174, 
178–87. 
 106. EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 
300 (1953). 
 107. See MacCormick, supra note 105, at 181. 
 108. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 763. The description in PATTERSON, supra 
note 106, at 300–20, while several decades earlier, is to the same effect. 
 109. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the distinction between rules and standards 
and the policies favoring rules versus standards); Sullivan, supra note 60, at 
56–69 (same). 
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Justice Scalia’s view of precedent calls on courts to lay 
down clear-cut dictates whenever possible; those rules are then 
binding as rules on later courts until overruled.110 If precedents 
are viewed as more fact-bound or as relating to general princi-
ples rather than to specific rules, they begin to look much more 
like legal standards.111 In contrast to Scalia, the majority in 
Casey viewed Roe as creating a standard with flexibility around 
its “core,” rather than as an ironclad rule.112 
The general outlines of the standards/rules debate are fa-
miliar to lawyers and legal scholars. By creating sharp bounda-
ries, rules have the advantage of being easy to apply and highly 
predictable. Their application also is supposedly more objective, 
in the sense that the varying perspectives of decision makers 
are less likely to affect the outcome. Rules are also more readily 
applied by lower-level decision makers, an important consid-
eration in cases like Miranda113 where the law must be imple-
mented by low-level officials such as police officers. 
But rules also have the defects of their virtues. Creating 
sharp, easily applied lines comes at the cost of unfair treatment 
of unusual or borderline cases, which might otherwise warrant 
individualized treatment.114 Predictability comes at the ex-
pense of learning from experience, since new insights can only 
be incorporated in the law through the relatively radical step of 
changing the entire rule. “Objectivity” in applying rules may 
mean that disputes about constitutional values are often dis-
guised as semantic arguments about the meaning of the rule.115 
 
 110. SCALIA, supra note 59, at 7–9. The trimester system in Roe is plainly 
an effort to establish such a binding rule. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–
65 (1993). As one advocate of the theory of precedent concedes, this theory can-
not be reconciled with the conventional legal view that distinguishing a prece-
dent is different from partially overruling it. See Larry Alexander, Precedent, 
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 503, 507 (Dennis 
Patterson ed., 1996). 
 111. For some recent defenses of standards as opposed to rules in constitu-
tional law, see Toni M. Massaro, Constitutional Law as “Normal Science,” 21 
CONST. COMMENT. 547, 556 (2004); Suzanna Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good 
Judges, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 3, 15 (2004). 
 112. See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 70–74 (characterizing the dispute over 
the use of precedent in Casey in terms of rules and standards). 
 113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 114. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Formalism and the Red-Hot Knife, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 597, 601 (1999). 
 115. There are limits to how far a rule-based approach can go to limit judi-
cial discretion. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: 
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 542–43 
(1992). 
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Surely, constitutional interpretation should not turn on dueling 
dictionaries or fine-grained word splitting. 
Moreover, in the setting of a judicial body, treating prece-
dents as creating rules rather than principles or analogies in-
creases the demands on the Court as a collective institution.116 
The members of a majority must not only be able to agree on 
the outcome or on a general principle, but on the precise con-
tours of a rule of law. The foreseeable result of a rule-oriented 
approach to precedent is more fractured courts, with fewer ma-
jority opinions. 
Moreover, treating precedents as rules requires future 
judges to defer more completely to their predecessors, a degree 
of self-abnegation that may not come easily. Judges must feel a 
strong sense of commitment to precedent in order to follow not 
only the outcome and principle of an earlier case, but the pre-
cise legal test articulated by the court in that case. The tempta-
tion to abandon the rule will be correspondingly greater, espe-
cially when the follow-on case involves circumstances that were 
not contemplated when the rule was established or when a new 
judge does not agree with the original decision. This makes 
rules more brittle than standards, since they cannot be bent 
but only broken and recast. Thus, because a rule is less flexible 
than a standard, it is less likely to maintain the allegiance of 
later judges.117 Perhaps for this reason, rule-like precedents 
have a tendency to evolve into standards. This is exemplified by 
the way Casey reworked the rule-oriented Roe opinion, with its 
rigid trimester system, into the standard-like undue burden 
test.118 Rules have a way of weathering poorly as precedents. 
This is a lesson that Justice Scalia has learned, to his evi-
dent discomfort. In some important majority opinions, he has 
tried to create strong rules, only to discover that other Justices 
regarded these precedents merely as standards. For example, 
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,119 he attempted to establish 
sharp limits on standing,120 only to see the Court move back to 
a standard-like approach in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laid-
law Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.121 Similarly, he at-
 
 116. See id. at 538–39. 
 117. See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 90. 
 118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–79 (1992). 
 119. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 120. Id. at 560–62. 
 121. 528 U.S. 167, 181–83 (2000). Justice Scalia promoted a more rule-like 
approach to takings law in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
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tempted to move takings law away from the standard-based 
approach of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City,122 only to see that approach triumphant again a few years 
later.123 Judicial announcements of rules do not work unless 
judges are motivated to stick with them faithfully; otherwise, 
they are merely misleadingly emphatic ways of creating stan-
dards. 
The choice between rules and standards is ultimately a 
pragmatic one. In the setting of constitutional doctrine, how-
ever, standards often have a strong advantage over rigid rules 
simply because it is easier to gain and then maintain majority 
support for them. Thus, there is much to be said for treating 
constitutional precedents as sources of principles or of fruitful 
analogies rather than as entrenching rigid rules of law, except 
in unusual cases like Miranda where there is a special need for 
sharp boundaries to guide government officials. 
It may seem that treating precedents as standards rather 
than rules undercuts the very stability that stare decisis was 
supposed to provide. But there is a difference between stability 
and rigidity. Maximizing stability may call for flexibility, as the 
familiar comparison between the storm-resistant qualities of 
oaks and willows reminds us. 
CONCLUSION 
Stare decisis limits the extent to which any vision of consti-
tutional meaning can be incorporated into the law. The body of 
existing law is simply too unwieldy to fit any tidy theoretical 
scheme, whether based on maximizing social welfare, respect-
ing original meaning, or upholding ethical theories. And yet, 
without stare decisis, none of these other sources of constitu-
tional meaning can effectively be transformed into law. If 
precedent carried no weight, whatever the Court might say 
about constitutional meaning today would be up for grabs to-
morrow. 
While precedent can help stabilize law, it is a mistake to 
expect too much from it. Notwithstanding some of the loose 
language of the Casey opinion, no one prior decision can be 
 
1003 (1992), and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). 
 122. 438 U.S. 104, 123–27 (1978). 
 123. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 336–37 (2002). 
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completely sacrosanct. Moreover, the effort to make precedents 
a source of bright-line rules is often apt to fail. Precedents more 
often serve as a source of principles and a basis for analogy, 
uses that make them less decisive but more rugged than most 
efforts at judicial “rulemaking.” There are limits to how much a 
court, especially in a constitutional case, can act like a legisla-
ture, laying down clear rules that will govern the future. 
Thus, precedent provides incomplete constraint, but real 
guidance nonetheless. At the same time, it provides a founda-
tion for an evolving body of doctrine. Consequently, it gives us a 
constitutional regime stable enough to support the rule of law, 
but flexible enough to adapt to changing constitutional visions. 
